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Drivers of sub-supplier social sustainability compliance: An emerging economy 
perspective
Abstr ct
Purpose: Tragic incidents like the Rana Plaza building collapse call into question the value and 
effectiveness of supplier codes of conduct (SCC) used in multi-tier supply chains. This paper 
investigates the drivers of sub-supplier social sustainability compliance from the perspective of 
suppliers that adopt a double agency role by complying with buyer-imposed SCC while managing 
sub-supplier compliance on behalf of the buyer.
Design/Methodology: This research adopts a sequential, mixed-methods approach. The 
qualitative phase develops a conceptual model with the aid of the extant literature and semi-
structured interviews with 24 senior manufacturing professionals. The quantitative phase uses 
hierarchical regression analysis to test the conceptual model using survey data from 159 apparel 
suppliers based in India.
Findings: The findings reveal that sub-supplier compliance is positively impacted by effective 
buyer-supplier governance and by the focal supplier having a strategic partnership with the sub-
supplier. Conversely, price pressure on sub-suppliers adversely impacts their compliance, while the 
institutional pressure on them to comply is generally ineffective.
Research Limitations: The context of the study is limited to the apparel manufacturing industry 
in India. 
Practical implications: To improve SCC compliance rates, buyers and focal suppliers should 
actively develop strategic partnerships with selected upstream supply chain actors; should set a 
reasonable price across the supply chain; and, should include specific sub-supplier compliance 
requirements in the supply contract. The findings also suggest the need to develop social 
sustainability protocols that are cognisant of regional contexts.
Originality/Value: Given the absence of prior research on SCC implementation by sub-suppliers, 
this study represents a pioneering empirical study into such multi-tier sourcing arrangements. It 
provides strong support that sub-supplier governance arrangements differ from those typically 
found in the focal supplier layer. It also provides empirical evidence of the critical factors that 
encourage sub-supplier compliance within the apparel industry of an emerging economy. 
Keywords: Sustainability, Garment industry, India, Empirical study, Suppliers
Type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction
The global apparel retailers increasingly require their suppliers to comply with social sustainability 
requirements (Rahim, 2017), with such obligations often stipulated in a supplier code of conduct 
(SCC). The SCC establishes guidelines for such factors as workplace health and safety, work hours 
and overtime limits, reasonable wages, and enforcement of child labour laws among many others 
(Jiang, 2009; Mani & Gunasekaran, 2018; Mani et al., 2018a). A common practice by the global 
production networks is for the focal supplier to utilise sub-suppliers, perhaps to source raw 
material or subcontract production activities to achieve cost, flexibility, or capability advantages. 
Achieving supplier compliance in such a multi-tier/multi-level supply chain is particularly 
challenging because focal supplier responsibility extends ‘down’ to the echelon of the sub-suppliers 
(Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010; Grimm et al., 2014; Perry et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2015; Huq et al., 
2016; Wilhelm et al., 2016). Although Grimm et al. (2016) define an indirect supplier to be a sub-
supplier, this study defines a sub-supplier as a partner organisation that helps the focal supplier to 
fulfil its supply chain commitments with additional capacity and process capability. For example, 
in the apparel industry, sub-suppliers perform such processes as washing, printing, and dyeing. 
More often than not, these contractors are undeclared to the international brand/primary 
customer (Huq et al., 2014).
The consequences of SCC non-compliance are perhaps most clearly illustrated by major 
industrial disasters, such as the Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, with the loss 
of 1134 lives. Moreover, other incidents such as the Foxconn employee suicides, India’s Bhiwandi 
factory collapse, Unilever’s labour exploitation scandal, and the Dhaka and Karachi fires have 
increased concerns about the effectiveness of SCC implementation within the various supply chain 
layers (The Economist Report, 2012; WSJ Report, 2013; Barber, 2017; Huq & Stevenson, 2018). 
Such incidents not only damage brand reputation but creates alarm that leads to monitoring and 
governance issues, and increased concern about compliance standards and their implementation. 
For example, the resulting public outrage over working conditions in factories manufacturing on 
behalf of reputable brands like Walmart, Primark, and Benetton led to questions about the 
motivations and ethics of overseas buyers, factory owners, law enforcement agencies, and even 
governments (Marshall et al., 2015; Lee & Rammohan, 2017; Huq & Stevenson., 2018). The 
inherent complexities of a highly fragmented production network dominated by small and 
medium-sized enterprises and subcontractors (Mezzadri, 2014) underscores the importance of 
exploring SCC implementation in multi-tier sourcing environments (Huq et al., 2014). However, 
the extant literature lacks a clear description of the sub-supplier sustainability dynamics (Grimm 
et al., 2016). 
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Quantitative studies of noncompliance behaviour have only recently been a focus in the 
literature, and few of those have explored SCC compliance from the supplier perspective (Jiang, 
2009; Mani & Gunasekaran, 2018; Huq & Stevenson, 2018). Value chains located in regionally 
developing economies and industry settings are deemed especially worthy of empirical study 
(Sodhi, 2015; Lee & Tang, 2017; Mani et al., 2018b). This research adopts a focal supplier 
perspective due to a dual agency role in which the supplier is responsible for the noncompliance 
behaviour of its sub-suppliers while also reporting sustainability across its production cycle; a 
phenomenon known as a ‘chain liability’ (Choi & Hong, 2002; Hartmann & Moeller, 2014; 
Wilhelm et al., 2016; Soundarrajan & Brammer, 2018).
The extant literature on social sustainability emphasises unmanaged social issues that cause 
disruption, risk, reputational damage (Eltantawy et al., 2009; Mani et al., 2018a), and describes how 
improved management leads to benefits including better operational performance (Sancha et al., 
2015). However, detailed research into the drivers of social sustainability adoption focusing on the 
sub-supplier linkage is only emerging now. For example, Sancha et al. (2015) promote the role of 
institutional pressures, i.e., normative, coercive and mimetic, and firm-specific capabilities (supplier 
integration), and Marshall et al. (2015b) observed that social sustainability compliance drivers in 
the supply chain include the presence of a sustainability culture and entrepreneurial orientation. 
Others have established that buyer pressure, having a sustainability culture, regulatory pressure, 
and social organisation pressure are essential drivers that lead to social sustainability adoption in 
the upstream supply chain (Mani & Gunasekaran, 2018). As the social issues are time dependant, 
dynamic and contextual, it is interesting to know their drivers in different emerging economy 
contexts, where there can be a significant direct impact o  bottom-level workers (Dobers & 
Halme, 2009; Werner, 2009). However, studies to date primarily emphasise upstream supply chain 
social sustainability and focus on the focal organisation’s first-tier suppliers. They are also silent 
about sub-supplier social sustainability, and many of them involve a developed nation context. 
Consequently, we judged a quantitative study from the focal supplier’s perspective the ablest to 
provide profound insights into sub-supplier management, which is a perennial challenge in global 
value chain governance. Suppliers often adopt a double agency role by complying with buyer-
imposed SCC while managing sub-supplier compliance on behalf of the buyer (Wilhelm et al., 
2016). Thus, this research explores SCC implementation in the sub-supplier echelon from the focal 
supplier’s perspective (Soundarrajan & Brammer, 2018; Mani & Gunasekaran, 2018). In particular, 
it focuses on the fundamental question: What are the critical drivers of sub-supplier social sustainability 
compliance?
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In the absence of research with a sub-supplier focus, this study represents a pioneering 
empirical study into multi-tier sourcing arrangements within the apparel industry of a regionally 
emerging economy. A mid-level theory development approach is adopted to gain insights into the 
sub-supplier echelon of a complex global production network through the lens of the focal 
supplier. The study uses a sequential, exploratory mixed methods approach involving both 
qualitative and quantitative paradigms, as our research question demands in-depth analysis and the 
problem domain lacks empirical evidence regarding sub-supplier governance. A conceptual model 
was derived using the extant literature and semi-structured interviews with 24 senior 
manufacturing professionals. The model is empirically validated via a hierarchical regression 
analysis using survey data from 159 apparel suppliers based in India.
The study makes several vital contributions that advance knowledge about sub-supplier 
governance and SCC implementation. It highlights how institutional support is ineffective during 
SCC adoption and shows that price pressure adversely impacts SCC implementation. The study 
also deliberates the importance of providing unified buyers’ guidelines to focal suppliers (regarding 
sub-supplier SCC governance) that are region-specific, and it offers critical inputs to future policy 
frameworks. 
Section 2 reviews relevant literature and Section 3 develops the conceptual model and 
hypotheses. Section 4 explains data collection and analysis, while Section 5 discusses the findings. 
Finally, two sections present theoretical and managerial implications and conclude the study with 
suggestions for further work, respectively. 
2. Literature Review
This review contains four sub-sections, concerned with supply chain compliance processes; social 
sustainability and upstream supply chains; social issues, reputation, and performance benefits; and, 
drivers of social sustainability in multi-tier environments. 
2.1 Supply chain compliance 
Due to increased complexity caused by global sourcing, many retailers are under enormous 
pressure to regulate the social and environmental norms of their supply chain operations (Stigzelius 
& Mark-Herbert, 2009). In turn, the suppliers to the global production networks are required to 
comply with a range of norms concurrently (Kolk & Van Tulder, 2005; Rahim, 2017), and must 
manage institutional and political pressures designed to promote and support compliance (Rahim, 
2017). Thus, effective compliance management is especially critical and demanding within the 
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labour-intensive supply chains of branded consumer products (Bremer & Udovich, 2001; Lee & 
Rammohan, 2017). 
Compliance takes place through the combined effects of organisational policies, labour rules, 
and safety regulations that make use of transactional and relational approaches (Cao & Lumineau, 
2015; Lawson, 2017; Yawar & Seuring, 2017; Mani et al., 2018a). Moreover, global certification 
schemes often validate the environmental and social compliance efforts (Pedersen & Andersen, 
2006; LeBaron et al., 2017) that contribute to the sustainability performance of customers and 
reduce sustainability-related risks. Such schemes imply close supervision and continuous 
sustainability auditing that increases supply chain traceability (Castka & Balzarova, 2008). Buyers 
tradeoff cost with flexibility when choosing public social standards over private ones and suppliers 
prefer public standards due to their lower asset specificity (Asif et al., 2019). Regardless, all such 
efforts improve sustainability-focused alignment and encourage better integration with the 
sourcing function in supply chains (Foerstl et al., 2014). 
2.2 Social sustainability and the upstream supply chain
The international apparel brands often struggle to manage the social sustainability of their global 
supply chain when SCC compliance obligations encompass several tiers of suppliers (Tachizawa 
& Yew Wong, 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2016; Yawar & Seuring, 2017). Reduced supply chain 
transparency (Tachizawa & Yew Wong, 2014) and reluctance by suppliers to comply with SCC 
requirements often mean that the focal suppliers are held responsible for ensuring the compliance 
of upstream raw material suppliers and sub-suppliers. Thus, focal (Tier-1) suppliers act as a 
middleman and assume a dual agency role for implementing social sustainability standards at both 
their own and sub-supplier locations (Wilhelm et al., 2016). This role requires them to closely 
monitor inhouse compliance at sub-supplier facilities (Tachizawa & Yew Wong, 2014; Lee & 
Rammohan, 2017).
Those suppliers responsible for selecting sub-suppliers in a multi-tier environment will aim to 
fulfil customer expectations and business objectives (Mena et al., 2013; Grimm et al., 2016) via 
coordination mechanisms designed to ensure social sustainability compliance. The first mechanism 
is hierarchical, wherein the focal supplier firm coordinates all activities, and the second is a market 
mechanism in which stakeholders, including sub-suppliers, take individual responsibility for 
complying with requirements (Ciliberti et al., 2011). Hierarchical mechanisms are the most 
prevalent for sub-supplier engagements in global value chains owing to the many priorities; 
including cost, process, and lead time requirements. These requirements lead the focal (Tier-1) 
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suppliers to act as a buyer and a strategic outsourcing partner in a dual agency role (Wilhelm et al., 
2016). Depending on the level of global sourcing maturity and other considerations, a downstream 
buyer may facilitate the selection of (preapproved) sub-suppliers from a ratified vendor list (Mena 
et al., 2013). 
The practice of unannounced sub-supplier engagement is prevalent in the apparel 
manufacturing industry (Huq et al., 2014), in which the sub-suppliers usually have no direct control 
over the supply chain and lack knowledge of broader supply chain issues and operations. Thus, 
failures by the supplier to monitor and control the social and environmental performance of its 
sub-suppliers may cause a customer/buying agency to bypass that Tier-1 supplier and attempt a 
direct relationship (Me a et al. 2013). 
2.3. Social issues, reputation, and performance benefits
Operational problems caused by unattended social issues within the supply network may impact 
the performance of the whole supply chain and negatively impact the reputation of the brand 
(Mani & Gunasekaran, 2018). For example, the clothing brand Zara, like Mattel Inc., was criticised 
for the poor working conditions at its sub-supplier locations that were being managed by Tier-1 
suppliers (Wilhelm et al., 2016). Also recently reported was the exploitation of female workers at 
sub-supplier locations managed by Indian apparel suppliers to Next, C&A, Mother Care, and 
H&M, among others (Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018). These incidents, if left unattended, may 
lead to supply disruptions and supply chain risk in global supply chains (Klassen & Vereecke, 
2012). On the other hand, well managed social issues in the supply chain results in performance 
benefits for the focal firm; primarily operational, social and supply chain performances (Sancha et 
al., 2015; Mani et al., 2018a,b). 
These incidents indicate that informal networks, order quantity, and market support all 
contribute to sub-supplier social sustainability practices (Mair & Marti, 2009; Lund-Thompson & 
Lindgreen, 2014). Cultural differences, inappropriate incentive structures, and supply chain 
complexities may also impact social sustainability compliance (Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010). Hence, 
there is likely to be no simple formula for assuring sub-supplier social sustainab lity compliance in 
multi-tier apparel supply chains (Grimm et al., 2016). Additionally, social issues are time 
dependant, contextual and dynamic, and are likely to vary geographically. The literature does not 
appear to include many of these factors which, in practice, appear to drive sub-supplier compliance 
directly or indirectly. Some sub-suppliers are resource-deprived, so might expect help from their 
focal suppliers. This expectation implies that cost plays a crucial role in shaping sub-supplier 
commitment, as those stakeholders often expect assurance of good returns and business continuity 
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(Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018). Suppliers tend to address their stakeholders’ needs according 
to the norms of the institutions under which they operate (Campbell, 2007). Hence, when 
pressured by competitors and regulatory norms, including SCCs, suppliers attempt to align tasks 
with local institutional dynamics when implementing socially responsible practices and also 
attempt to coerce their sub-suppliers into meeting those expectations (Zhu et al., 2013). However, 
very few studies appear to relate to this vital sub-supplier ecosystem or consider the effect of 
institutional pressures on social sustainability compliance. 
It is challenging for a sub-supplier to perform to international standards when its business 
partners demand quality products and services at an unrealistically low cost. Suppliers that coerce 
sub-suppliers to comply with customer standards in this manner may prompt a decoupling 
behaviour that ultimately harms end-customer confidence (Grimm et al., 2016; Wilhelm et al., 
2016). While such behaviour is often ascribed to environmental or social behaviour uncertainties, 
other factors include contractual agreement norms, power symmetry, and transparency of supply 
chains (Grimm et al., 2014). These possibilities still need to be empirically validated in a specific 
industry and regional setting, which further prompted this research to explore the dynamics of 
sub-supplier management (Grimm et al., 2016; Wilhelm et al., 2016). 
2.4 Drivers of social sustainability in the upstream supply chain
Most sustainability supply chain studies have explored different social issues, social 
sustainability management, and performance benefits, although even here, research on emerging 
economies is at the emerging stage. However, studies into the factors that drive supplier social 
sustainability adoption/compliance in the upstream supply chain are gaining momentum 
(especially studies at the sub-supplier level). Ehrgott et al. (2011) confirmed the positive influence 
of mid-level employees, customers and government pressures on socially sustainable (upstream) 
supplier selection. Similarly, Marshall et al. (2015b) identified a sustainability culture and an 
entrepreneurial orientation to be drivers of basic and advanced social sustainability practices in 
Tier-1 suppliers in the context of developed nations. However, because global supply chains 
extend their supply reach into different geographies and suppliers, facilities located in another 
country might be subject to different institutional pressures that help shape the firm’s response to 
sustainability. 
Moreover, Sancha et al. (2015) assert that normative, mimetic and coercive institutional 
pressures influence sustainable supplier development. In a similar vein, Meixell & Luoma (2013) 
advocate the importance of stakeholder pressure in sustainability awareness, adoption, and 
compliance in the supply chain and, more recently, Mani & Gunasekaran (2018) confirmed the 
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drivers of social sustainability adoption in emerging economies; concluding that customer 
pressure, social, organisational pressure, regulatory compliance, and sustainability culture are 
drivers of social sustainability. However, these studies mostly had general sustainability 
perspectives encompassing both environmental and social measures. 
The operational dynamics of traditional (focal/direct) suppliers have been extensively studied 
(Grimm et al., 2014). However, still lacking is detailed empirical research into sub-supplier 
sustainability management practices despite recent interest in multi-tier supply chain sustainability 
(Grimm et al., 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2016; Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018). Also, most social 
sustainability studies take place in the context of a developed nation, with emerging nations only 
recently receiving attention (Huq et al., 2014; Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018). Specifically, there 
is a gap in studying sub-supplier sustainability management within the Indian apparel industry; a 
complex global value chain in which sub-supplier engagement is common practice (De Neve, 
2014). In particular, the recent work by Soundararajan & Brammer (2018) is limited to describing 
the design of sub-supplier governance based on reciprocity and fairness. Consequently, there is 
ample scope to explore how sub-suppliers can be managed by decoding the micro-level 
interactions that shape the reality of sub-supplier social sustainability. Annexure 1 summarises the 
associated literature regarding multi-tier, sub-supplier, and sustainability management.
3. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development
In the absence of substantive literature on sub-supplier dynamics and limited theory-building research 
into compliance governance (Grimm et al., 2014), it was judged appropriate to utilise a mid-range 
theory-building approach to gain new perspectives (Wacker, 1998). The study adopts a sequential, 
exploratory, mixed-methods approach by combining interpretive and positivistic paradigms in 
sequence to gain insights into multi-tier compliance governance (Creswell & Clark, 2011; 
Venkatesh et al., 2013). A sequential narration method was adopted (first qualitative, then 
quantitative) wherein the results of one methodology led to or motivated the use of another 
methodology (Figure 1). This approach was preferred over a juxtaposition or parallel presentation 
of results from different methods because it provides the opportunity to gain deeper understanding 
via qualitative content analysis of how practitioners view the sub-supplier compliance 
phenomenon. Moreover, it helps to develop a conceptual model backed by literature findings 
validated via a quantitative survey in the second stage (Fawcett & Magnan, 2002; Park et al., 2018). 
These methods, in combination, were also helpful in overcoming a limitation of the model, that 
of not incorporating real-life practice, and improved the generalisability of the measurement scales 
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(Boyer & Swink, 2008). Recent social sustainability studies evidence a similar mid-range theory-
building approach to gain new perspectives (e.g., Porteus et al., 2015), and there is also interest in 
mixed-methods research applications in supply chain studies (Golicic & Davis, 2012). 
FIGURE 1 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
India was chosen as the research setting because it is one of the major production hubs for the 
global apparel brands. Garment production accounts for around 14% of India’s industrial 
production and 4% of its Gross Domestic Product, with a market value expected (before the 
COVID-19 pandemic) to be USD 82 billion by 2021 (IBEF Trade Report, 2017). The sector has 
highly skilled workers and is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises that engage in 
declared and undeclared subcontracting agreements to meet business requirements. 
Initially, semi-structured interviews investigated the factors that affect sub-supplier compliance 
governance in practice. This approach directly focused on the research topic and yielded insights 
into perceived causal inferences. As shown in Table 1, a convenience sample of 24 highly 
experienced professionals included factory heads, chief executive officers, and manufacturing 
consultants. Due to the expert specificity and the focus of the study, the respondents chosen to 
provide insights on sub-supplier governance were selected using a non-probabilistic purposive 
sampling strategy (Esenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Minimum selection requirements called for at 
least ten years’ experience in sub-supplier management and critical account handling and 
knowledge of apparel industry SCC compliance. The initial selection of 30-35 participants also 
considered the availability and willingness to participate. Identification of participants was via 
personal contact and industry referral, both to assure accessibility and the likelihood of espousing 
candid insights. They represented each of the prominent Indian apparel manufacturing clusters 
 Literature review
Qualitative study
(Semi-structured 
interviews) 
Model development
Triangulation 
Discussions 
Quantitative study (Survey) 
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based in Bangalore, Chennai, Tirupur, and New Delhi. Annexure 2 provides further details. A 
constant comparison method identified the data saturation point of sampling beyond which there 
were no new insights, which was reached by the twenty-first participant and confirmed by 
continuing with three more participants (Strauss & Corbin 1998).
TABLE 01 PARTICIPANT PROFILE
Position in the industry sector Experience 
(Average 
Years)
Number of 
participants
CEOs/Owners/Vice-Presidents/Senior Professionals 
(SP) 
22 5
Manufacturing/Factory Heads (GM) 17 6
Business/Key Account Managers (KAM) 17 6
Manufacturing/Compliance Consultants (CO) 16 4
Compliance Audit/, CSR/Quality Executives (CA) 14 3
Individual interviews were of 40-50 minutes duration and held in informal settings. A two-step 
standard protocol identified and analysed the patterns that relate to exploring and explaining views 
on sub-supplier governance. The critical questions raised were:
 What are the primary drivers for your sub-suppliers to comply with your issued requirements?
 What are the main challenges of managing sub-supplier compliance?
 Do you keep buyers informed of sub-supplier arrangements?
 How do you trade-off between your business needs and compliance requirements? 
 What are the additional measures taken to ensure sub-supplier compliance?
Following transcription, the in-depth interview responses provided the base data for conceptual 
model development using open, axial, and selective coding procedures and a constant comparison 
inductive approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Braun & Clarke, 2006). Annexure 3 outlines the 
qualitative theme development, in which open coding identified the fundamental concepts 
expressed by participants explaining the antecedents of sub-supplier governance. The process 
involves identifying, categorising, and naming phenomena found in the text into discrete concepts, 
ideas, events, and acts, and assigning a code to represent the study area. Axial coding identifies 
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relationships between codes via the combination of inductive and deductive thinking. Axial coding 
developed broad categories reflecting open code commonalities, which reduced the number of 
concepts related to sub-supplier compliance. Then, the selective coding process identified five final 
constructs for the study (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Once there was consensus on the final coding, the process terminated. The iterative process 
helped to ensure interpretation consistency and enhanced the reliability of the coding. At this time, 
we contacted industry practitioners and researchers to seek explanations for discrepancies and 
conceptual clarifications. The final two-step validation process made use of guidelines provided 
by Creswell & Clark (2011) in a member-checking process with the original participants. By the 
final triangulation step, qualitative insights informed the finalised constructs, and the proposed 
model and its hypothesised relationships. The process was repeated with a selection of (new) 
industry practitioners following refinement of the model, and again, each construct was identified 
and finalised on a consensual basis. The literature provided theoretical constructs that reduced the 
number of codes used. 
Figure 2 depicts the resulting conceptual model, containing factors which from the focal 
supplier perspective drive SCC compliance at the sub-supplier echelon.
FIGURE 02. HYPOTHESISED RELATIONSHIPS
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As indicated in Table 2, treated as exogenous variables are four constructs: Focal SupplierSub-
supplier strategic partnership; BuyerFocal Supplier governance; Price pressure; and, Institutional pressure. Also, 
considered to be a moderating factor for the effect of Focal SupplierSub-supplier strategic partnership 
on Sub-supplier SCC compliance is the Transparency construct. The constructs reflect overall resource 
requirements and propensity to adapt in a compliance environment. Conceptual understanding of 
the constructs and their hypothesised relationships is described below with the aid of the extant 
literature and participant feedback.
 TABLE 02 DESCRIPTION OF CONSTRUCTS
Constructs Description
Institutional pressure
Coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures faced at the sub-supplier – 
supplier echelon.
Transparency The level of information shared between suppliers and sub-suppliers
Supplier-Sub-supplier
strategic partnership
Strategic relationship between the focal suppliers and sub-suppliers. These
sub-suppliers assist the focal (Tier-1) suppliers in the processes such
embroidery, washing, printing, dyeing, sewing, and etc.
Buyer-Supply governance
Standard procedures and rules given by the buyers/brands (such as Wal-
Mart and Nike) to the focal suppliers towards effective management of the
sub-suppliers including their selection.
Price pressure Price pressure exists across the supply chains
 
3.1 Hypotheses Development
3.1.1 Focal SupplierSub-supplier strategic partnership. 
Achieving comprehensive SCC compliance in a global supply chain requires the commitment of 
every actor, even in outsourcing-dominated industries (Pedersen & Andersen, 2006; Grimm et al., 
2016). From a compliance perspective, the supplier usually stipulates the norms expected of its 
sub-supplier and offers help toward achieving successful SCC implementation (Gimenez & 
Tachizawa, 2012). Extending the analogy given by Fink et al. (2006) for the customer-supplier 
relationship to the sub-supplier environment, the challenge is to balance supplier firm 
requirements with a sub-supplier contribution.
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A strategic supply partnership is recognised to be essential for assuring long-term associations 
with external suppliers (Li et al., 2005). Such arrangements help both organisations to establish the 
trust needed for mutual problem-solving and fulfilment of prespecified requirements. Because the 
need for monitoring is minimal, joint value creation can be targeted via inter-organisational 
information sharing, direct investment in sub-supplier operations, and assistance with technical, 
human resource and other supply chain improvement issues (Pedersen & Andersen 2006). Carter 
& Jennings (2004) report how a strategic association between a buyer organisation and a supplying 
organisation positively impacts socially responsible practices. As one of the participants (factory 
manager) asserted, “It is difficult to convince our sub-suppliers to align with our compliance requirements if we 
do not have a long-term business relationship with them.” 
Moreover, the focal suppliers facilitate socially sustainable practices with their sub-suppliers via 
ongoing dialogue and negotiation, knowledge creation/dissemination, and by offering a financial 
incentive (Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018). Sub-suppliers, in turn, expect to have a strategic 
relationship with their focal suppliers. They hope to garner innovative ideas that motivate workers 
to comply with social sustainability requirements; for example, when they need to encourage their 
machine operators to wear eye guards and gloves. Also, regular briefing and training sessions 
between suppliers and their sub-suppliers help to implement and monitor social sustainability 
practices. Occasionally the focal supplier may offer financial assistance to a sub-supplier by 
facilitating loan arrangements. Such inter-organisational support activities improve the quality of 
the dyadic relationship, which leads to actual social sustainability implementations (Pedersen & 
Andersen, 2006). 
Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: A focal supplier’s strategic partnership with a sub-supplier positively impacts sub-supplier SCC 
compliance 
3.1.2 BuyerFocal supplier governance. Buyersupplier governance is a generally used mechanism 
whereby the buyers/brands impose their norms via contracts with suppliers that reflect inter-
organisational expectations. Expounding supply chain roles and responsibilities act as a primary 
safeguarding mechanism against conflicts because otherwise, the various suppliers may not have a 
clear understanding of how to govern the supply chains (Bai et al., 2016). They also indirectly help 
to ensure transparency via monitoring of the direct and indirect partners in the supply chain 
(Soundararajan & Brown, 2014). 
Major apparel industry players such as Walmart, Nike, Patagonia, and Inditex have developed 
global framework agreements (GFAs) that provide overall direction to their global suppliers on 
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how to manage their sub-suppliers (Miller, 2011). As one manager (GM4) stated, “The reputable 
buyers and brands have stipulated regulations on what [performance] to expect from sub-suppliers in social 
sustainability operations. These provide direction on how to select the ‘right’ sub-suppliers and a detailed governing 
framework”. Such guidelines are intrusive when they restrict the focal supplier’s freedom to manage 
its sub-suppliers (Heide et al., 2007; Lee & Tang, 2017). On the other hand, they do play a vital 
role in reducing the risk of siloed implementations and opportunistic behaviour across supply 
chains (Yadlapalli et al., 2018). While GFAs primarily help the buyers take control of the supply 
chain, they can be considered an attempt to mitigate conflicts in sustainability adoption (Lee & 
Rammohan, 2017). In recognising their importance in contractual and integrated supplies 
management, and in guiding the selection and management of sub-suppliers, buyer-imposed 
norms frequently become internalised at the sub-supplier location as part of SCC implementation. 
Thus, it is hypothesised that:
H2: Buyer focal supplier governance positively impacts sub-supplier SCC compliance
3.1.3 Price pressure. Price is a do inant decision-making factor impacting overall firm-level 
behaviour and trust in the supply chain (Hartmann & Caerteling, 2010). Hence, price management 
is a key performance indicator in a competitive market where industrial customers require quality 
material at a reasonable price (Fynes & Voss, 2002). When a downstream buyer focuses on 
achieving the maximum profit from minimum costs, it burdens the various supply chain echelons 
with low-price contracts (Van Tulder & Mol, 2002; Jiang, 2009). Giving in to the price pressure 
risks unethical practices when achievement of delivery and product quality at the lowest cost takes 
precedence over SCC compliance (Jiang, 2009). As one key account manager (KAM6) stated, “Our 
sub-supplier demands a price that is at least equal to the level they achieve in their market. We understand the need 
for that if we are to get the best commitment to fulfilling the order, including social sustainability compliance. 
Unfortunately, the profit margins restrict our ability to respond positively”. In short, price pressure and the 
concomitant need for cost containment leads to trade-offs in meeting many requirements, 
including social compliance (Jiang, 2009). Hence, it is hypothesised that:
H3: Price pressure in the supply chain adversely impacts sub-supplier SCC compliance
3.1.4 Institutional pressure. A firm’s business strategy is influenced by a formal environment that 
encompasses vital consumers, competitors, and regulatory agencies, including industry 
associations and governments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Suppliers seeking to adopt sustainable 
supply chain practices that go beyond the legal obligations need to adhere to institutional pressures 
and social expectations, which can increase legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities. Recent 
apparel-industry research describes the implementation of sustainability principles under 
institutional pressure (Pedersen & Gwozdz, 2014), in which the principal actors tend to influence 
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outsourcing relationships via norms and values formulated via coercive, mimetic, and normative 
isomorphism. Similar to legal norms, they remain as functional triggers in driving sustainable 
operations (Lee & Tang, 2017). They help firms that seek to adopt and manage sustainability 
principles beyond fulfilling legal commitments (Hutchins and Sutherland, 2008). Besides, 
restriction, expectation, and influence of institutional elements would also impact the firm’s 
behaviour. Hence, institutional pressures need to be factored into the firm’s compliance 
management strategy (Campbell, 2007). 
Coercive pressure that causes suppliers to comply with requirements is the directive pressure 
of stakeholders formed by the interaction of contextual factors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It 
affects top manageme t’s attitude and behaviour toward compliance (Sharma et al., 1999) and is 
pervasive at both industry and firm levels (Hoejmose et al., 2014). While industry level pressure 
comes from local industry requirements to prompt compliance (Son & Bebasat, 2007), the firm-
level pressure comes from the downstream partners through purchase contracts to comply with 
specific SCC requirements (Vachon & Klassen, 2006). Eventually, in practice, firms cascade those 
pressures to their upstream suppliers, including their subsidiaries (Surroca et al., 2013). In India, 
the local manufacturing associations offer awareness and training programs that indirectly coerce 
sub-suppliers to adopt effective compliance management strategies. The recent disasters have 
triggered local industry councils to focus on SCC compliance and close ongoing monitoring by the 
buyers (Hoejmose et al., 2014). Such coercive behaviour is taken seriously and can give rise to 
proactive and socially responsible strategies that align suppliers with institutional norms. In 
extending this observation into the subcontracting domain, it is posited that recognition of 
coercive pressure in the operating environment positively impacts compliance at the sub-supplier 
level. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H4: Coercive institutional pressure positively impacts sub-supplier SCC compliance
Mimetic institutional pressure influences firms to imitate successful competitors as a response 
to uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As a result, under the influence of mimetic 
isomorphism, they tend to standardise processes to remain competitive. One participant (GM2) 
reported how suppliers could come under pressure to adopt best practices, “In some cases, we seriously 
consider adopting competitor practices for managing sub-supplier compliance to get into our buyer’s ‘good books’. 
The mimicking activity is not only necessary to conform with local practices but may extend to 
global level operations too if it is acceptable to stakeholders. Often in such cases of mimicry, peer 
practices are reported in areas like wages, leave procedures, employee benefits, and security norms. 
Recent literature emphasises the positive influence of mimetic pressure on the firm’s ability to 
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implement sustainable practice (Dubey et al., 2015). By extending this observation into the sub-
supplier domain, it is posited that a supplier attempting to replicate competitor best practice will 
also positively impact compliance at the sub-supplier facility. Thus, it is hypothesised that:
H5: Mimetic institutional pressure positively impacts sub-supplier SCC compliance
Normative pressure derives from cultural norms and a shared understanding of acceptable 
practices and legitimised actions in a domain (Welford, 2005). Industry norms reflected in 
customer and market requirements exert normative pressure on focal suppliers to adopt 
sustainability practices ‘across all echelons’. When a focal supplier lacks clarity around issues related 
to SCC compliance, it may adopt industry norms that eventually infuse value to impact business 
strategy beyond mere technical requirement (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These unique normative 
regulations may vary according to the regional settings and cannot be generalised in other 
economies (Welford, 2005; Cai et al., 2010). Also, increased regulations and pressure from global 
brands is forcing the suppliers to be stringent about SCC requirements (Chi, 2011). Eventually, the 
supplier gains legitimacy, so needs to ensure ongoing SCC compliance with its sub-suppliers (Liang 
et al., 2007). Thus, it is hypothesised that:
H6: Normative institutional pressure positively impacts sub-supplier SCC compliance
3.1.5 Transparency. Lack of transparency, which adversely impacts social and environmental 
performance (Lee & Rammohan, 2017), is contended to be a principal cause of the Rana Plaza 
disaster (Lee et al., 2017). Here, transparency is referring to mutual information sharing that creates 
value in the supply chain (Lamming et al., 2001). A focal supplier seeking to assure SCC standards 
will demand specific information from its sub-suppliers in order to be able to extend all possible 
assistance to them (Lee et al., 2017). The important information to be shared between the focal 
supplier and its sub-supplier includes details of health and safety conditions, labour practices, and 
working hours (Parise & Casher, 2003). In practice, the complexity of the apparel industry means 
that suppliers face a variety of significant challenges when managing information across different 
supplier echelons (Perry & Towers, 2009). For example, the limits of ethical transparency tend to 
be dictated by the marketplace and by society, and both of these influences corporate action. 
Hence, a sub-supplier may be reluctant to share information it deems sensitive due to a business 
priority or societal constraint. Sub-suppliers also do not usually share the same level of 
commitment that exists between the focal supplier and its primary buyer/customer. 
A senior professional (SP2) who also recognises the value of transparency in a strategic 
relationship stated: “Without an open exchange of information related to sub-supplier operations, it is difficult 
for us to engage and help them with their compliance activities even though they have been an approved factory for 
Page 16 of 50Supply Chain Management: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Supply Chain M
anagem
ent: an International Journal
17
some time”. More objectively, the positive relationship of strategic supplier partnership with the 
code of conduct compliance at the sub-supplier location is most robust under conditions of 
heightened transparency. Hence, it is hypothesised that:
H7: Transparency moderates the relationship between the focal supplier’s strategic supply partnership with 
its sub-supplier and sub-supplier SCC compliance
4 Survey administration 
4.1 Instrument development and data collection 
For the second phase of the research, a questionnaire survey incorporated reflective indicators for 
the measurement model. The measures were taken directly from well-recognised studies or were 
adapted to fit the study context both to avoid using untested variables and to reflect the 
perceptions of focal suppliers on sub-supplier governance. 
Multi-item measures increased the reliability and validity and reduced measurement error by 
ensuring variability among the respondents (Churchill, 1979). Most items utilised a six-point 
Likert-type scale, with anchors of 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree; 0 = Do not 
know/Not applicable. The SupplierSub-supplier strategic partnership construct was adapted from Li 
et al. (2005) and Qrunfleh and Tarafdar (2013) and used six items to assess the supplier’s strategic 
supply partnership with its sub-suppliers. The BuyerSupplier governance construct was adopted from 
Jiang (2009) and used six items. Four items, adapted from Jiang (2009), were used to measure 
supply chain Price pressure. Here, price war intensity uses the scale described above, whereas pricing 
trend items were measured using a six-point Likert-type scale, with anchors of 1 = far below and 
5 = far above; 0 = Do not know/Not applicable. For the Institutional pressure construct, nine items 
were adapted from prior research by Liang et al. (2007) and Hoejmose et al. (2014) to measure the 
institutional dimensions of normative, coercive and mimetic pressure in a compliance situation. 
The moderating variable Transparency was measured using five items from Eggert and Helm (2003), 
and the construct primarily measures supplier knowledge of sub-supplier operations. Finally, for 
the dependent construct Sub-supplier SCC compliance, five items were adapted from Goebel et al. 
(2012). 
The model was controlled for extraneous effects. The first of these is the number of years of 
working with the sub-supplier (Relationship age). Firms with a longstanding relationship were judged 
more likely to might have more experience with, and hence more interest in enforcing, contract 
norms (Jiang, 2009). Another effect is the proportion of the order subcontracted to the main sub-
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suppliers (Order size) as the more substantial order sizes might create significant power imbalances 
during contract negotiations and encourage heightened levels of SCC enforcement.
Content validation of the measures during instrument development occurred in two ways. 
Initially, four academicians and five practitioners reviewed the items, which was followed by a pre-
test with 25 potential participants and the items again amended. The data collected was used to 
check the content validity of the final questionnaire, and changes were made based on suggestions 
received to ensure the items were understandable and relevant to the context. 
The survey was administered to a range of prominent apparel production clusters located in 
Bangalore, Chennai, Tirupur, and New Delhi. Organisation details accessed via the Apparel Export 
Promotion Council (AEPC), and the Clothing Manufacturers Association of India (CMAI) 
resulted in the targeting of 210 firms. Purposive random sampling coupled with a snowball strategy 
finalised the critical respondent pool. This pool included business owners, chief executive officers, 
compliance managers, key account executives, merchandising managers, marketing professionals 
and other professionals with influence over sub-supplier management. 
As recommended by Ibeh & Brock (2008) for developing economies, and supported by Baruch 
& Holtom (2008), a drop-and-collect-survey (DCS) method was adopted to ensure a high response 
rate. This method is a relatively inexpensive and reliable means of reaching key informants directly 
and involves personal, or postal delivery and personal pickup after completion (Brown, 1987). The 
method also provides an opportunity for researchers to gain insights through personal interaction 
with key informants. Contacts at local industry associations also facilitated the field data collection 
process. A split questionnaire was administered to two respondents within each focal-supplier 
organisation as a two-part ex-ante measure to mitigate common method variance (Raghunathan & 
Grizzle, 1995). The first part concerned the SCC compliance, transparency, and price pressure 
constructs, and the second part the institutional pressure, suppliersub-supplier strategic 
partnership, and buyer-supplier governance constructs. 
The data collection itself turned out to be very challenging in practice, which was partly due to 
the need for two respondents from each participating firm. Consequently, the lead researcher spent 
three months intensively travelling around India visiting potential respondents. All the respondents 
were briefed to recall their compliance strategy with sub-suppliers and informed that all the 
information given would remain confidential. The main characteristics of the responding firms are 
in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 FIRM PROFILE
Years 
Established No %
Number of 
Employees No %
Annual 
Turnover* No %
7-10 14 8.8 1-1000 105 66.04 0-10 81 50.9
11-20 72 45.3 1001-2000 22 13.84 11-20 40 25.2
21-30 57 35.8 2001-3000 11 6.92 21-30 21 13.2
>30 16 10.1 >3000 21 13.2 >30 17 10.7
         
*USD million
Note: percentages do not necessarily add up to 100% due to rounding
4.2. Analysis
4.2.1 Sample size. 
There was a total of 159 usable responses out of the 210 completed responses collected. The 
response rate (75.71%) was judged adequate for an exploratory study for predicting the R2 value 
of 0.50 (95% significant level) at 80% statistical power (Cohen, 1992; Hair et al., 2016). This view 
was confirmed by the G*Power 3 software package (Faul et al., 2007) and validated via gamma 
exponential and inverse square root methods, which address sampling concerns (Kock & Hadaya, 
2018). An estimated minimum sample size of 142-155 responses resulted. 
4.2.2 Common method variance and non-response bias. 
Several steps controlled for common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). As mentioned 
above, the ex-ante measure of dividing the questionnaire into two parts to mitigate common 
method variance (Raghunathan & Grizzle, 1995), required that a different person complete each 
part. Also, the constructs were not disclosed to the respondents, to minimise respondent bias, and 
the items were randomised to reduce the possibility of respondents comprehending construct 
correlation. Harman’s single-factor test checked that a single general factor did not account for 
most of the measures’ covariance. Also, and in line with Kock and Lynn’s (2012) 
recommendations, common method variance was tested via a full collinearity variance inflation 
factor (VIF). All of the values were less than the threshold value of 3.3 for every construct 
(Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009), indicating that common method variance and collinearity are not a 
significant concern in this research. The high response rate indicates that non-response bias is also 
unlikely to be an issue. 
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4.2.3. Discriminant validity. Discriminant validity assessed item loadings in specific constructs to 
avoid the model misspecification problem. Table 4 shows that the (square root) average variance 
extracted (AVE) values (0.766-0.897) for the constructs are all higher than their cross-correlation 
values, and all exceed the recommended minimum of 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
TABLE 04 DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
Constructs NP MP CP Pr SSP BSG CoC T Years Size
NP 0.816
MP 0.029 0.887
CP -0.006 0.091 0.897
Pr 0.029 0.135 -0.031 0.887
SSP 0.058 -0.084 0.566 -0.203 0.799
BSG -0.064 -0.132 0.038 -0.334 0.29 0.766
CoC 0.022 -0.073 0.191 -0.439 0.468 0.441 0.82
T 0.027 0.025 -0.126 0.051 -0.198 -0.139 -0.139 0.769
Control
Years -0.022 -0.121 0.3 -0.3 0.582 0.364 0.472 -0.194 1
Size -0.034 0.006 0.27 -0.153 0.275 0.196 0.348 -0.049 0.291 1
Composite reliability verified discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2006) and all the constructs 
exceed the recommended minimum of 0.65 (Table 5). Also, no construct inter-correlation value 
has a value of 1.0, and each item loaded on its specific latent variable, thereby confirming its 
dimension (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).
TABLE 05 CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Item 
code
Description factor 
loading 
mean SD
&
alpha CR**
SupplierSub-supplier partnership (SSP) (Li et al. 2005, 
Qrunfleh and Tarafdar 2013)
2.68 1.37 0.88 0.91
SSP1 We consider quality to be our number one criterion 
when selecting an outsourcing partner
0.85
SSP2 We regularly solve any business problems (including 
compliance) jointly with our suppliers
0.81
SSP3 We help our outsourcing partners to improve their 
compliance environment and product quality
0.85
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SSP4 Our long-term continuous improvement programs for 
social compliance include all of our key subcontracting 
suppliers
0.84
SSP5 We always include our subcontracting suppliers in our 
planning and goal-setting activities for social 
compliance
0.73
SSP6 We always actively consider our subcontracting 
partners in any new business developments
0.71
BuyerSupplier governance (BSG) (Jiang, 2009) 2.59 1.33 0.76 0.85
BSG1 When we outsource, the buyers always require us to 
comply with the code of conduct
0.65
BSG2 Buyers always work closely with us on code of conduct 
implementation at the sub-contracting partner level
0.71
BSG3* Rather than working with us on solving outsourcing 
problems around code of conduct implementation, our 
buyers switch to another supplier 
< 0.5
BSG4* We are very aware of the outsourcing regulations and 
norms of our buyers 
< 0.5
BSG5 The outsourcing regulations and norms of our buyers 
are clear
0.84
BSG6 The outsourcing regulations and norms of our buyers 
are helpful to us when we make business decisions
0.85
Price pressure (PP) (Jiang 2009) 2.49 1.00 0.91 0.94
PP1 There is an intense price war in the category our 
product is subcontracted for
0.91
PP2 The subcontractor is always pushing for a higher price 0.92
PP3 Compared to the expected price we will probably set an 
export price level that is…
0.88
PP4 Compared to the industry average we will probably give 
a price to our subcontracting partners that is…
0.84
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Transparency (T) (Eggert and Helm 2003) 1.95 1.15 0.76 0.85
T1* We exchange all relevant information with our 
subcontractors on a regular basis
< 0.5
T2 We are very aware of every subcontractor’s financial 
situation
0.61
T3 We are very aware of every supplier’s organisational 
structure 
0.84
T4 We are very aware of every subcontractor’s supply 
chain capabilities
0.74
T5 Our main sub-contractor’s business processes are very 
transparent to us 
0.86
Institutional Pressure (Liang et al., 2007; Hoejmose et al., 2014)
Coercive Pressure (CP) 2.38 1.01 0.88 0.93
CP1 Conditions in our industry force us to monitor social 
compliance norms across the supply chain, including 
with subcontracting partners
0.87
CP2 Local industry associations set helpful guidelines for 
implementing social compliance norms across the 
supply chain, including with subcontracting partners
0.92
CP3 International customers are more sensitive to social 
compliance procedures at the subcontracting level
0.90
Mimetic Pressure (MP) 2.68 1.01 0.86 0.91
MP1 Competitors that have adopted social compliance 
across all supply chain layers have benefited greatly
0.90
MP2 Competitors that have adopted social compliance 
across all supply chain layers are favourably viewed by 
firms in the same trade
0.93
MP3 Competitors that have adopted social compliance 
across all supply chain layers are favourably perceived 
by customers
0.82
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Normative Pressure (NP) 4.32 0.67 0.75 0.86
NP1 For retaining customers, our firm’s success significantly 
depends on the implementation of the code of conduct
0.83
NP2 Government norms are pressuring us to monitor social 
compliance across all echelons of our supply chains
0.86
NP3 Our main customers expect us to closely monitor 
compliance procedures at the subcontracting level
0.75
Sub-supplier SCC compliance (SCC) (Goebel et al. 2012) 2.44 1.22 0.88 0.91
SCC1 The code of conduct is widely distributed to every 
stakeholder throughout our supply chains
0.83
SCC2 Every stakeholder throughout our supply chains is 
required to acknowledge that they have read the code 
of conduct requirements
0.66
SCC3 Every stakeholder throughout our supply chains is 
required to acknowledge that they have received clear 
instructions regarding code of conduct requirements
0.87
SCC4 The managers and owners of subcontracting partner 
firms are regularly required to assert that their actions 
comply with the code of conduct
0.84
SCC5 The code of conduct is formalised throughout the 
organisations
0.88     
*BSG3, BSG4, and T1 were dropped due to poor loading & standard deviation
 ** composite reliability # subcontractor represents washing, printing, embroidery and dyeing suppliers 
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4.2.4. Convergent validity and reliability. 
Table 5 also shows the final scale items and their descriptive and reliability measures. Each 
construct’s Cronbach’s (alpha) value (0.85-0.94) exceeds 0.7, indicating the internal reliability of 
the scale item sets (Nunnally, 1978). Confirmatory factor analysis shows the convergence of eight 
of the constructs. Corrected item-total correlation analysis purified each construct by dropping 
items loading less than 0.5. As a result, two items were dropped from the Buyersupplier governance 
construct and one item from the Transparency construct. Otherwise, every loading score exceeds 
the threshold value of 0.5 and is significant at p<0.01; hence convergent validity is demonstrated 
(Nyaga et al., 2010). 
The model shows the Goodness of Fit (GoF) value of 0.603 to be much higher than the cut-
off value (0.36) and in explaining the geometric mean of average commonality, is acceptable 
according to Wetzels et al. (2009). Regarding the model quality indices, values of Sympson’s 
paradox ratio (0.889); the R-squared contribution ratio (0.991); the statistical suppression ratio (1); 
and, the nonlinear bivariate causality direction ratio (1.0) all confirm correct association directions 
of the constructs in the hypotheses. Consequently, we judge the model to be rigorous regarding 
causality.
4.2.5 Hypothesis testing 
The hierarchical regression method used to test all the hypotheses is considered conservative and 
robust compared with other covariance-based techniques. Four hierarchical models are in Table 
6. The first model, which includes only the control variables to assess their overall effect on the 
code of conduct compliance, explains 26.4% of the variation on the dependent variable. The model 
is also significant (F=27.962, p<0.05); there is a significant independent effect of the selected 
control variables on sub-supplier SCC compliance. 
The second model adds in all of the independent study variables to the control variables, to 
assess the role of the independent study variables. This model explains 43.1% of the overall 
variation on the dependent variable (F= 14.196, p<0.05). An important observation from this 
model is that none of the institutional pressure components (coercive, mimetic, and normative) 
indicate significant relationships. 
Model 3 (Table 6) adds in the hypothesised moderating effect of transparency. The results hold 
all the other indicators constant under the control variables inclusion. This model indicates no 
significant moderation by the interaction effect (SSP*T). Finally, Model 4 offers sufficient β and 
R-squared estimate values for meaningful interpretations.
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 TABLE 06 HIERARCHICAL MODEL RESULTS
 
  *p<0.001; # p<0.01; &p<0.05;*** no significance 
Figure 3 summarises the results of hypothesis testing. The standardised coefficient is significant 
between the focal suppliersub-supplier strategic partnership and the sub-supplier SCC 
compliance (0.239, p<0.01 level). This finding indicates that focal supplier organisations having a 
robust sub-supplier partnership are likely to achieve social sustainability compliance at the sub-
supplier location. Hypothesis H1 is supported.
 The coefficient between buyerfocal supplier governance and sub-supplier SCC compliance is 
also significant (0.211, p<0.01 level). This finding supports the proposition that a competent 
buyersupplier governance has a positive impact on SCC compliance at the sub-supplier location. 
Hypothesis H2 is supported.
The coefficient between price pressure and sub-supplier SCC compliance is significant and 
shows the expected inverse relationship (-0.257, p<0.001). This finding supports the proposition 
that price pressure in the supply chain has an inverse impact on SCC implementation at the sub-
supplier location. Hypothesis H3 is supported. 
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The institutional pressures - coercive pressure, mimetic pressure, and normative pressure - do 
not appear to have a significant impact on SCC compliance at the sub-supplier location. Hence, 
there is no support for hypothesis H4, H5, and H6. 
Finally, no significant effect exists for the moderating effect of transparency on the relationship 
between the focal suppliersub-supplier strategic partnership and SCC compliance at the sub-
supplier location. Hence, Hypothesis H7 is also not supported. Also, the number of certifications 
held, and the company’s financial turnover have no significant effect on third-party certification 
implementation. 
Tra
nsp
are
ncy
Strategic supplier
partnership
(with sub-
suppliers)
Price
Pressure
Buyer- (Focal)
Supplier
governance
Supplier code of
conduct (SCC)
Implementation at sub-
suppliers
Control variables
Relationship age
Order size
H1*
*: ß
= 0.
239
, p<
0.05
H2**: ß=0.211, p<0.01
H3:** : ß=-0.257, p<0.001
Institutional Pressure
Coercive
Mimetic
Normative
H4: *** H
5:
**
*
H6
: *
**
H1, H2, H3 ** : Supported
H4, H5, H6, H7 *** : Not Supported
H7: ***
 
FIGURE 3 MODEL WITH HYPOTHESIS TESTING RESULTS
5. Discussion
This research demonstrates how a focal supplier that maintains a strategic supply partnership with 
its sub-supplier will positively impact the SCC compliance of the sub-supplier. Keeping sub-
suppliers in the dark is a primary driver of SCC noncompliance behaviour (Hoejmose et al., 2014). 
Participants reported that a close supply partnership arrangement assists both parties by helping 
the sub-supplier understand the supplier’s expectations (and vice versa) and by building trust and 
a stronger relationship. 
A focal supplier may choose to invest effort into sub-supplier operations, contingent on such 
considerations as order size and ability to fulfil the order. Such action reduces the financial burden 
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and stimulates the sub-supplier to fulfil SCC obligations in both the technical and compliance 
areas. This finding accords with Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) describing how organisational 
behaviour is affected by external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The participants 
recommended that focal suppliers should develop a strategic partnership with their sub-suppliers 
and involve them at every phase of business operation, from planning to final order execution. 
The demonstrated positive relationship between the buyerfocal supplier governance and sub-
supplier SCC compliance suggest that buyers should establish clear directives for their focal 
suppliers to manage sub-supplier compliance actively. Such buyer directives to Tier-1 suppliers act 
as an internal trigger (observed as part of internal supply chain systems) for the entire compliance 
process. Thus, focal suppliers act as sustainability agents and work on guidelines provided by their 
buyers (Foerstl et al., 2014). Advising these focal suppliers about business changes and requiring 
them to monitor sub-supplier compliance processes accords with agency theory, which addresses 
problems arising due to differences between the goals and desires that arise between the principal 
and agent. 
In the present context, SCCs provide a mechanism for the buyer (principal) to help it direct its 
supplier (agent) to manage compliance across multiple supply chain layers (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Logan, 2000; Wilhelm et al., 2016), achieved via detailed instructions from buyers through buyer-
supplier governance (Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010, Asif et al., 2019). The participants described how 
the directives of a few buyers enabled focal suppliers to exercise control over their sub-suppliers; 
acting as a safeguarding mechanism by clarifying the respective supply chain roles and 
responsibilities (Bai et al., 2016; Lee & Rammohan, 2017). For example, the Inditex Group (a 
major apparel manufacturer) has developed a global framework agreement that provides overall 
direction for supplier compliance, including outsourced activities (Miller, 2011). However, the 
participants also acknowledged that many brands do not have specific guidelines for sub-supplier 
compliance, thus failing to deter sub-suppliers from noncompliance behaviours. 
The finding that price pressure in supply chains has a direct, adverse impact on sub-supplier 
SCC compliance aligns with findings by Jiang (2009) concerning brands and their focal suppliers. 
The finding also confirms a UK-based study that price pressure is one of the critical barriers to 
SCC implementation (Walker & Jones, 2012). This effect is apparent in apparel subcontracting and 
other industry networks in developed economies, such as involving automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals (Anner et al., 2013; Harms et al., 2013). Mainly, this is because buyers impose 
price-sensitive contracts on focal-suppliers, who extend the pressure onto their sub-suppliers. 
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The participants also affirm that sub-suppliers are unlikely to be interested in addressing 
noncompliance issues if they are not receiving a fair financial return on their products and services. 
It seems reasonable that such price-squeezing hinders SCC compliance generally (Gugler & Shi 
2009) since global value chains are under intense pressure to control the costs of their production 
networks (Jayasinghe, 2016). The participants acknowledge that sub-suppliers often blame the 
pricing structure for their noncompliance behaviour and will generally seek an upcharge to adopt 
the specific practices required by the focal supplier/downstream buyer. Also reported as common 
practice within the Indian apparel industry is how buyers will set a fixed profit target per order and 
will try to drive down price margins, which the suppliers again pass through to their sub-suppliers. 
Also observed in emerging economies, especially in the sub-supplier echelon, are the same 
operational and market pressures (including price and consumer awareness) that dominate 
institutional requirements in developed countries (Starcher, 2005; Jiang, 2009).
Although Bartley (2011) recommends an institutional layering approach to ensure compliance 
within the different tiers, the present study reveals an absence of strong institutional governance 
in an emerging economy like India. All three institutional pressures appear to have no significant 
impact on sub-supplier SCC compliance. Participants attributed the ineffectiveness of institutional 
factors to compromised monitoring and follow-up culture in India, which in turn is due to focal 
suppliers having higher commercial priorities around the price, quality, and delivery. The market 
also lacks uniform norms (especially concerning salary, overtime, and leave management practices) 
due to differences in local operating environments (Ve katesan, 2019). 
In contrast, developed countries like the UK and the Netherlands have robust institutional 
arrangements that govern the entire spectrum of the supply chain (Baden, 2009, Soundarrajan & 
Brammer, 2018). Hence, the absence of strong institutional governance could be one of the main 
reasons for incidents like the Rana Plaza building collapse and the Dhaka fire (AlJazeera Report, 
2016). Such incidents also highlight the challenges of ensuring SCC implementation beyond the 
focal suppliers due to problems of institutional spread (Juttner & Maklan, 2011). Overall, our 
findings align with those of Mair & Marti (2009), who state that emerging economies lack strong 
institutional support for compliance operations. 
Normative pressure, which derives from cultural norms and a shared understanding of 
acceptable practices and legitimised actions, does not impact sub-supplier SCC compliance., a 
situation that differs markedly from the case for focal supplier compliance governance. Possible 
reasons include such resource constraints as cost, an intensely competitive business environment, 
and other competing supply chain requirements. Also, while regulation, industry association 
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activity and location-specific norms stimulate professional and cultural behaviours (Gereffi & Lee, 
2016), these stakeholders do not offer guidance or apply the pressure at the sub-supplier level that 
would help to ensure compliance. This lack of action is a crucial barrier to sustainable practice 
adoption and signals weak coordination between the stakeholders.
Mimetic pressure showed no significant impact on sub-supplier SCC compliance. Although 
such pressure can influence firms to imitate successful competitors, most Indian sub-suppliers 
have little interest in benchmarking or learning from their peers and competitors about successful 
compliance practices. One participant (a Managing Director) confirmed that sub-suppliers are 
often not interested and cited that costs and production complexities are significant inhibitors. 
The fear of not getting proper recognition for best practice adoption by other buyers or even other 
suppliers reduces the mimetic effect that could cause conflicts among stakeholders. Moreover, 
such mainly small and medium-sized enterprises (Gereffi & Lee, 2016) tend not to be influenced 
by local compliance practices and norms that misalign with their cognitive frameworks (Wu et al., 
2012). Other reasons could be organisational culture, the constant pressure to meet cost and 
delivery production parameters and the attitude of top management. Also, production system 
ambiguity and social complexities could cause the sub-suppliers to not benchmark against the best 
sustainable practice. 
Coercive pressure similarly showed no significant impact on sub-supplier SCC compliance, 
which implies that Indian sub-suppliers refuse to be browbeaten into a compliance environment. 
The practitioners report that this attitude is a strong reaction to blatant behaviours and excessive 
controls and procedures by the buyers and their representatives, which go well beyond stipulated 
governance and routine follow-up; resulting in their refusal to follow even minor instructions. 
Conversely, it is acknowledged that some production clusters and local manufacturing councils 
offer compliance awareness programs and guidelines. Although this could be perceived as indirect 
coercion, there is some evidence that the practice positively affects sub-supplier SCC compliance; 
a finding that accords with the arguments of Soundarrajan & Brammer (2018). Our finding that 
the transparency of sub-supplier operations does not moderate the relationship between the focal 
supplier’s strategic partnership with the sub-supplier and SCC implementation contradicts our 
hypothesis. It seems that stakeholders choose to be operationally transparent during the initial 
collaboration stages of establishing the partnership, when they may employ what may be termed 
opportunistic behaviour to impress their new partner. Such behaviour may help to gain new 
business and take the relationship to the next level. Also, when a sub-supplier is unfamiliar with 
Page 29 of 50 Supply Chain Management: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Supply Chain M
anagem
ent: an International Journal
30
specific compliance requirements or end customer (brand) expectations, or it lacks operational 
understanding, this may cause the focal supplier to step in and assist. 
Later in the relationship, any reduced level of transparency will have an insignificant impact on 
code compliance because the information shared during the initial stages will have formed the 
basis for SCC implementation and successful continuing compliance audits. The participants 
agreed that reduced transparency at a later stage does not have a significant impact on SCC 
compliance because there is already a good understanding between partners about their roles and 
responsibilities. After the business relationship forms, reduced intensity of monitoring by buyers 
and suppliers can be expected. However, the main reason for some of the recent compliance 
fiascos in India and Bangladesh is due to the suppliers being kept ‘in the dark’ (Hoejmose et al., 
2014). This fact makes it vital that buyers develop ongoing engagement strategies that motivate 
their sub-suppliers and suppliers to continue transparency between one another. 
6. Implications 
6.1 Theoretical Implications
This study advances knowledge of SCC governance in complex apparel manufacturing settings by 
investigating sub-supplier SCC compliance from the focal supplier perspective; a focus that 
appears to be absent in the literature. It investigates the drivers of sub-supplier compliance from 
the perspective of suppliers that adopt a double agency role by complying with buyer-imposed 
SCC while managing sub-supplier compliance on behalf of the buyer. It also adds a perspective to 
the compliance literature by deliberating on the focal supplier’s perspective of sub-supplier SCC 
adoption. The derived conceptual model contributes to the literature of structural, organisational 
characteristics and inter-organisational interactions that are needed to manage compliance 
operations at sub-supplier locations. 
Our deliberations through multiple lenses have reviewed the interactions that impact relational 
and contractual governances. Rather than a single theoretical underpinning, this research proposes 
an integrated approach that extends the views of practitioners in formulating sub-supplier 
governance strategies. The model conceptualises the importance of buyersupplier governance, 
suppliersub-supplier partnerships, and supply chain price pressure (and the interactions), together 
with institutional pressures that impact sub-supplier SCC compliance. Although the literature has 
explored the role of institutional pressure in sustainability, the interactions with other compliance 
drivers are absent. 
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This study recognises the complexity of SCC implementation in multi-tier supply chains, which 
have contributed to major disasters like the Rana Plaza building collapse. The theoretical 
implication is that it is vital to analyse the rationale and effectiveness of institutional pressure that 
directly or indirectly influence social compliance by focusing on appropriate framing. The study 
also triggers the need to understand more fully the displacement of stakeholder responsibility at 
the sub-supplier level. 
Our study builds a strong foundation for building robust theories, specifically on sub-supplier 
governance, and it provides critical insights into the design of supply contracts with sub-suppliers. 
The study also deliberates how partnerships that maintain a minimum level of transparency can 
positively drive sub-supplier SSC compliance. This finding aligns with Fynes & Voss (2002) who 
highlight a preference for inter-organisational governance rather than coercion. Finally, and as 
described by Jiang (2009), the study underscores how supply chain pricing influences sub-supplier 
compliance. Overall, it is a pioneering study that offers strong support for the notion that sub-
supplier governance differs from that of the other supplier echelons.
6.2 Managerial Implications
The paper makes several practical contributions to the sub-supplier domain. Firstly, guidelines for 
developing and maintaining socially sustainable operations are absent from the manager’s toolkit 
(Golini et al., 2014). Hence, this study is of value to those stakeholders seeking assurance that every 
supply chain member organisation is compliant with the brand’s SCC. It is not enough for buyers 
and brand managers to be sensitive to social sustainability issues; they need to focus their efforts 
on the constructs shown to be valid drivers of SCC compliance. 
Secondly, and given that the buyerfocal supplier governance is effective, buyers should 
explicitly stipulate in supply contracts the requirements for sub-supplier SCC compliance and the 
responsibilities of focal suppliers in managing sub-supplier compliance. Such requirements will 
help enforce the double agency role (Wilhelm et al., 2016) of focal suppliers, which will help to 
ensure SCC compliance not only of the local operation but also the operation of their sub-
suppliers. Also, the buyers should work with their focal suppliers to develop transparent 
procedures for managing sub-supplier SCC compliance. Proper monitoring and audit procedures 
that hold focal suppliers and sub-suppliers accountable for SCC non-compliance must be 
established. 
Thirdly, our study endorses the need for substantial cooperation between stakeholders when 
focusing on SCC adoption and ongoing compliance. Focal suppliers involved in a strategic 
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partnership with sub-suppliers need to provide information sufficient for achieving SCC 
compliance from the pre-production stage. Regular order placement with sub-suppliers would 
enhance their confidence, which would positively impact the compliance environment. 
We also recommend that brands design and adopt unified standards that are cognisant of local 
practices and emphasise the need for intensified horizontal cooperation with other brands and 
other stakeholders, such as via certifying bodies and industry associations. In this way, appropriate 
practices for monitoring labour overtime, safety procedures, and wage payments, which may not 
currently be complying with global SCC norms, may be established. 
Fourthly, the insignificance of institutional pressure calls for a stronger emphasis on the role of 
government and industry associations, to develop the needed protocols, including for the sub-
supplier echelon. Such protocols may eventually result in a review of country-specific accreditation 
schemes in emerging economies. These include India’s Driving Industry Towards Sustainable Human 
Capital Advancement (DISHA) and the ACCORD and ALLIANCE standards in Bangladesh, which 
provide specific SCC guidelines and recognise sub-supplier governance separately. Similarly, 
policymakers may consider incentivising the suppliers to monitor SCC implementation across all 
of their supply chain echelons. Thus, the impact of our results may trigger a complete review of 
existing institutional policies; particularly contract establishment, monitoring, and follow-up 
auditing schemes. 
Fifthly, our findings indicate that excessive price pressure adversely impacts SCC compliance, 
which should alert the brands and their sourcing managers to the need to offer a fair price in supply 
contracts. We recommend that the average industry price should be offered to sub-suppliers when 
negotiating the contract, to motivate them to take more of an interest in being SCC compliant. 
Moreover, we recommend that buyers consider paying an upcharge to incentivise sub-suppliers to 
adopt the required best practices. In short, rather than resorting to coercion, the buyer stakeholders 
should aim to develop trust-based strategies that explicitly motivate the sub-suppliers to become 
compliant and operationally transparent.
Finally, multi-tier supply chain compliance management provides an opportunity for firms to 
contribute to achieving the sustainability development goals of the United Nations, specifically 
relating to maintaining health and well-being, gender equality, decent work, and the promoting of 
strong institutions. The primary internal triggers are from buyers/customers/retailers and 
consumers. They exert influence on ensuring sub-supplier social sustainability compliance through 
Buyer-Supplier governance and close monitoring programs. Stakeholders external to the supply chain, 
such as local governments and industry associations, can also contribute to enforcing sub-supplier 
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compliance provided that developing countries have robust institutional governance. Hence, the 
larger buyers/retailers could consider using their position of power within the market to push for 
more robust institutional governance in developing countries, which will result in benefits from 
having multi-tier supply chain SCC compliance. 
7. Conclusion 
Sub-supplier SCC governance is complex and challenging. The global brands and focal suppliers 
require that their sub-supplier echelons maintain sustainable production environments. Although 
sub-supplier arrangements are ubiquitous in apparel supply chains, studies of the sub-supplier 
sustainability dynamics are only just beginning to emerge (Grimm et al., 2014). This pioneering 
study used a mixed-methods research approach to investigate the driving factors behind sub-
supplier social sustainability compliance in a complex, multi-tier supply chain. Having such a 
detailed understanding of the factors that motivate sub-suppliers to comply with sustainability 
requirements is a crucial first step towards achieving SCC compliance in global value chains. The 
findings will assist researchers and practising managers to identify synergies and to prioritise the 
critical success factors that drive compliance behaviours at the sub-supplier level (Grimm et al., 
2014). Hence, this study sets the foundation for future research, and it underscores the need to 
investigate the drivers of sub-supplier compliance operations using specific theoretical lenses. 
A study of this scope inevitably has limitations. Firstly, the compliance norms and sub-supplier 
governance practices might vary across locations. Also, not investigated were the perceptions of 
the buyers regarding the drivers of sub-supplier SCC compliance. The drop-and-collect 
methodology might have caused some respondents to have insufficient time to answer the 
questions. Further research is needed into the effectiveness of contractual and relational 
governance on sub-supplier compliance management, and the difficulties encountered by sub-
suppliers when adopting compliance practices. It would be interesting to know how to measure 
the level of compliance at sub-supplier locations accurately, and hence the effectiveness of 
compliance audits and inspections. This study can also be replicated in other emerging economies 
and industries to help validate its findings and recommendations. 
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Annexure 1 Summary of literature
Theme References Focus points
Supply Chain 
Compliance 
Lawson et al. (2017) 
Leboron et al. (2017) 
Foerstl et al. (2015) 
New (2015); Wolf (2014)
- Importance of supply chain compliance 
and its processes (both social and 
environmental)
- How to manage stakeholders, which 
eventually creates value for the brand 
and influence its customers and wide 
marketplaces
Social Sustainability 
Huq & Stevenson (2018)
Mani & Gunasekaran (2018)
Yawar & Seuring (2017)
Marshall et al. (2015b)
Huq et al. (2014)
Mexiell & Luoma (2013)
- Drivers of social sustainability and 
organisational culture 
- Problems of implementation
- Emerging economy perspectives
- Entrepreneurial role-stakeholder 
interactions
- Identification of stakeholder influence 
on achieving social sustainability.
Multi-tier focus 
(including sub-
suppliers) 
Grimm et al. (2016)
Wilhelm et al. (2016) 
Grimm et al. (2014)
Hartman et al. (2012)
- Importance and governance of sub-
supplier compliance and dual agency 
role of the focal suppliers and their 
operational dynamics
- Elucidation of critical success factors in 
sub-supplier sustainability management 
- Significance of understanding the 
sustainability requirements of 
stakeholders in different layers
Supplier focused 
sustainability studies 
Huq & Stevenson (2018) 
Soundarrajan & Brammer 
(2018) 
Huq et al. (2014) 
Kumar & Rahman (2016)
Jiang (2009)
Pullman (2009)
- Compliance deviations in developing 
countries
- Establish the importance of capturing 
the supplier perspectives
- Implementation under challenging 
institutional contexts
Supplier code of 
conduct (SCC) 
implementation 
Boiral et al. (2017)
Ehrgott et al. (2014)
Jiang (2009) 
Llach et al. (2015) 
Perry et al. (2015) 
Egles-Zanden (2014) 
Ciliberti et al. (2011)
 
- Dynamics and challenges of SCC 
implementation 
- Diffusion of SCC in global value chains 
in multiple industries including the 
garment, toy, clothing, electronics, and 
building industries
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Annexure 2 Participant profile 
 
 Designation Location 
Experience 
(years) 
Firm Size
(employees)
1 SP1 Chief Executive/Managing Director Tirupur 16 3800
2 SP2 Vice-President (Operations) Various 18 10000
3 SP3 Managing Director Tirupur 22 6000
4 SP4 Head- Operations Bangalore 24 4300
5 SP5 Managing Director/Owner Madurai 28 700
6 GM1 General Manager Bangalore 20 8000
7 GM2 Factory Manager Chennai 12 1300
8 GM3 Chief Production Manager Tirupur 25 6500
9 GM4 Assistant General Manager Tirupur 14 5200
10 GM5 Factory Head Delhi 18 4200
11 GM6 Production Leader (Manager) Chennai 12 1800
12 KAM1 Merchandising Manager Coimbatore 16 720
13 KAM2 Merchandising Manager Tirupur 14 650
14 KAM3 Merchandising Head Tirupur 22 1400
15 KAM4 Divisional Merchandising Manager Chennai 19 3400
16 KAM5 Merchandising Manager Rajapalayam 16 640
17 KAM6 Senior Merchandising Executive Bangalore 14 1200
18 CA1 Quality Executive Tirupur 15 570
19 CA2 Compliance Manager Bangalore 10 920
20 CA3 Compliance Head Bangalore 16 4200
21 CO1 Consultant 1 Delhi 11 3200
22 CO2 Consultant 2 Chennai 17 1700
23 CO3 Consultant 3 Bangalore 21 1300
24 CO4 Consultant 4 Tirupur 16 1800
# Consultants (CO) are employed by the suppliers on a fixed-term basis; they are the part of the operational team 
to improve overall business efficiency including compliance. Their firm size indicates the size of the factory to which 
they are/were recently associated.
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Annexure 3 Qualitative Theme Development
 
Open coding 
(first level)
Axial coding 
(second level)
Selective coding 
(third level/constructs)
1
investments in sub-supplier 
operations
engagement and 
interest on sub-
suppliers
Strategic partnership with 
sub-suppliers 
2 give positive feelings to the 
sub-supplier
3 training the suppliers
4 regular visits and interactions
5 collaborate with the suppliers collaboration 
6 mutual benefit relationship 
7 business continuity
8 standard procedures in align 
with buyers
subcontracting 
governance framework
Buyer-Supplier 
governance 
9 advising the businesses on 
ethical practices
10 audits and approvals 
11
buyers’ interest and 
involvement
12 buyer instructions buyer guidelines
12
buyers’ interest and 
involvement
13
sub-suppliers request 
compliance framework 
14
changes in price and order 
flow price behaviour Price pressure
15
forced shrinking margins 
from buyers
16 focus on profits 
17 low price contracts
18 dominance on a pricing price war 
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19
competitive prices in the 
market
20 openness information sharing Transparency 
21
importance of two-way 
communication
22
the desire for open 
communication dd
23 documentation information value 
(importance)
24 information needed to 
improve compliance 
25 follow the peers competitor pressure Institutional pressures
26 follow the market practices market pressure
27 industry associations 
28
help from governmental 
norms regulative pressure
29
non-governmental / third-
party regulations
30 stakeholder pressure 
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